IVOf the Essence of God

I. Of the essence of God.

Of the essence of God? It was said that God is incomprehensible in his essence. Then it was said that he was a trinity. But I receive no reply to my answer, and get a new problem : God, who is incomprehensible in his essence, will be disclosed to me in his essence.

"The question of what God is in his essence (ova-ua, 4>vo'L'i, essentia, substantia, natter a), became, even in the first centuries of Christianity, a subject of especial attention for the teachers of the Church, on the one hand, as a question in itself of great importance and close to the mind and heart of each man, and, on the other hand, because at that time the question was taken up by the heretics, who naturally provoked against themselves the defenders of Orthodoxy."

Again, in order to disclose the truth to me, I am introduced to discussions and to the exposition of the opinion of this man and of that, and all of them are false, and :

"Avoiding all similar finesses, the Orthodox Church has always held only to what it has pleased God to communicate to her about himself in his revelation, and not having at all in mind the determination of the substance of God, which it recognizes to be incomprehensible and, therefore, strictly speaking, indeterminable, but wishing only to teach its children as precise, exact, and accessible an idea about God as is possible, it says about him as follows : ' God is a Spirit, eternal, all-good, omniscient, alljust, almighty, omnipresent, unchangeable, all-sufiScing to himself, all-blessed.' Here it points out to us, in the first place, the incomprehensible essence of God (or nature, or substance), as much as it can be comprehended now by our reason, and, in the second place, the essential attributes by which this essence, or more correctly, God himself, is distinguished from other essences." (pp. 94 and 95.)

The essence, nature, substance of God is pointed out to us, and so are the attributes by which God is distinguished from other essences. What are we talking about ? About a hmited being or about God V How can God be distinguished from others ? How can we distinguish in him substance, nature, and attributes ? Is he not incomprehensible ? Is not he higher and more perfect than anything ? Less and less do I understand the sense of what they are trying to tell me, and it is becoming clearer and clearer to me that for some reason they need inevitably, by rejecting sound reason, the laws of logic, conscience, for some secret purposes they need to do what they have been doing until now : to reduce my conception about God and the conception of all believers to a base, semi-pagan conception. Here is what is said about this nature and about the attributes of him who is here called God :

"17. The conception about the essence of God. God is a spirit. The word < spirit,' indeed, more comprehensibly than anything else signifies for us the incomprehensible essence or substance of God. We know of only two kinds of substances : material, complex substances, which have no consciousness or reason, and immaterial, simple, spiritual substances, which are more or less endowed with consciousness and reason. We can nowise admit that God has in himself the substance of the first kind, since we see in all his acts, both of creation and of foresight, the traces of the greatest reason. On the other hand, we are of necessity forced to assume the substance of the latter kind in God, through the constant contemplation of these traces." (p. 95.)

In confirmation of these unintelligible, perverse, intricate words there are quoted the words of St. John Damascene, which are almost as unintelligible and perverse.

"By knowing what is ascribed to God and from that ascending to the essence of God, we comprehend not the essence itself, but only what refers to the essence (to. Trepl Trjv ova-Lav,) just as, knowing that the soul is incorporeal, inquantitative, and invisible, we do not yet comprehend its essence; just so we do not comprehend the essence of a body, if we know that it is white or black, but we comprehend only what refers to its essence. But the true word teaches us that the Deity is simple and has one action (ivepyetav,) simple and doing good in everything." (p. 96.)

However painfully hard it is to analyze such expressions, in which every word is a blunder or a lie, every connection of a subject and predicate a tautology or a contradiction, every connection of one sentence with another a blunder or an intentional deception, it will have to be done. It says "spirit signifies substance."

Spirit is only the opposite of substance. Spirit is, above all, a word which is used only as an opposition to every substance, to everything visible, audible, tangible, perceptible by the senses. Essence, nature, substance is only a distinction of perceptive, sensual objects. By their nature, by their substance, by their essence, stones, trees, animals, men are distinguished.

But spirit is that which has not the essence of Nature. What, then, can the words, "Spirit signifies substance," mean ? Further : "We know only two kinds of substances, complex material and simple spiritual substances." We do not know and cannot know any simple spiritual substances, because "spiritual substance "is a mere contradiction. The plural number used with simple spiritual substance is another internal contradiction, because what is simple cannot be two or many; only with what is not simple do we get distinction and plurality. The addition to the word "substances "of "simple, spiritual, more or less endowed with consciousness and reason," introduces another internal contradiction, by suddenly joining to the simple concept that of consciousness and reason, according to the degree of which this something, which is called simple spiritual substances, is divided.

The words, "To admit that God has in himself the substance of the first kind," to be consistent, ought to have been, "To admit that the one God is complex, material substances," which is the merest absurdity, is an admission that the one God is a multiplicity of varied substances, of which it is impossible to speak. The words, "We are of necessity forced to assume the substance of the latter kind in God, through the contemplation of the works of his creation and foresight, in which traces of the highest reason are visible," signify not at all that God is a spirit, but that God is the highest reason. Thus, in examining these words, it turns out that, instead of saying that God is a spirit, they say that God is the highest intelligence, and in confirmation of these words are quoted the words of St. John Damascene, who says a third thing, namely, that the Deity is simple.

What is remarkable is that the conception of God as a spirit, in the sense of opposing it to everything material, is indubitable to me and to every believer, and has clearly been established in the first chapters about the comprehensibility of God, and that cannot be proved. But, for some reason, this proof is attempted, and blasphemous words about the investigation of the essence of God are pronounced, and the argument ends by proving that, instead of being a spirit, God is reason, or that the Deity is simple and has but one action. What is all that proved for ? Why, in order, when the need for it shall arise during an argument, to introduce the conception not of the one, simple spirit, but of spiritual essences, more or less endowed with consciousness and reason (men, demons, angels, who will be required later on), but more especially for that connection with the word "spirit," which later will play an important part in the exposition of the doctrine. We shall soon see for what purpose.

"And if, indeed, the revelation itself represents to us God as a spiritual being, our supposition must pass over to the stage of an indubitable truth. Now revelation teaches us, indeed, that God is purest spirit, not connected with any body, and that, consequently, his nature is entirely insubstantial, not partaking of the shghtest complexity, simple." (pp. 95 and 96.)

From the words "purest spirit," not connected with any "body," it appears at once that the word "spirit "is no longer understood in the sense in which it is taken in all languages, not as it is understood in the gospel discourse with Nicodemus, "The spirit bloweth where it listeth," that is, as a complete opposite to everything material, but as something that can be defined, separated from something else. Then Holy Scripture is quoted to prove that God is spirit, but, as always, the texts prove the very opposite.

"Can any hide himself in secret places that I shall not see him ? saith the Lord. Do not I fill heaven and earth ? saith the Lord (Jer. xxiii. 24; Psalm cxxxix. 7-12); (h) everybody has a definite shape and so can be represented, but God has no sensual form, and so the Old Testament strictly prohibited his being represented : To whom then will you liken God ? or what likeness will you compare unto him? (Is. xl. 18, 25); take ye therefore good heed unto yourselves; for ye saw no manner of simihtude on the day that the Lord spake unto you in Horeb out of the midst of the fire : lest ye corrupt yourselves, and make you a graven image, the similitude of any figure, the likeness of male or female (Deut. iVo 15-16); (c) for the same reason everybody may be visible, but God is called the invisible God (Col. i. 15; 1 Tim. i. 17; Eom. i. 20), whom no man hath seen at any time (John i. 18 and vi. 46), and in particular, whom no man hath seen, nor can see (1 Tim. vi. 16; cf. Exod. xxx. 18-23 ); {d) everybody, being composed of parts, is destructible and perishable, but God is the immortal king of the ages (1 Tim. i. 17>" (pp. 96 and 97.)

Is it not clear that God who seeth everywhere, who has spoken from the midst of the fire on Mount Horeb, who lias no similitude, that is, no form, who is immortal, is a spirit ? It is evident that it is necessary to be able to speak of God as of a definite being, something like a man; but it is also necessary to speak of God as of an entirely simple, inaccessible spirit. It is the old catch; in all the chapters of this book, two different conceptions are purposely united into one, in order, in case of necessity, to exchange one for the other and, making use of that, mechanically to pick out all the texts of Scripture and so mix them up that it shall be possible to blend what is discordant.

After that follows a statement of the teaching of the church and, as always, not the exposition of the dogma, not an explanation, not a discussion, but a controversy. The controversy is against the anthropomorphists and pantheists. It is argued that it is not true that God is clothed in flesh and is in everything like man. If the Scripture speaks of his body, "we must by his eyes, eyelids, and vision understand his all-seeing power, his allembracing knowledge, because through the sense of vision we obtain a fuller and more correct knowledge. By his ears and hearing we must understand his merciful attention and reception of our prayers; for even we, when we are asked, graciously incline our ear to the supplicants, showing them our favour by means of this sense. By his mouth and speaking we must understand the manifestation of God's will, for we, too, manifest our intimate thoughts by means of our lips and through speech. By his food and drink — our agreement with the will of God, for by means of the sense of taste we satisfy the necessary demands of our being. By smelling — the acceptance of our thoughts as directed toward God, and of our hearty disposition, for by means of the sense of smell do we become aware of perfume. By his face we must understand his manifestation in his works, for our faces also manifest us. By his hands — his active force, for we, too, do everything useful and, especially, everything costly with our own hands. By his right hand — his succour in just works, for we, too, in performing more noble and important deeds, such as demand a greater force, most generally make use of the right hand. By his touch — an exact knowledge and investigation of the smallest and the hidden, because those who are touched by us cannot conceal anything upon their bodies. By his feet and walking — his coming and appearance, in order to aid the needy, or defend them against enemies, or to do some other act, even as we walk with our feet to some destination. By his oath — the inalterableness of his counsel, for between us, too, mutual agreements are confirmed by an oath. By his anger and fury — his loathing and hatred of evil, for we, too, become angry and hate what is contrary to our will. By his forgetfulness, sleep, and dreaming — his slowness in wreaking vengeance on his enemies, and his delaying his succour until the proper time." (pp. 99 and 100.)

These explanations and refutations of the anthropomorphists, independently of the arbitrariness and unintelligibility of the explanations (as, for example, why by food and drink is to be understood our agreement with the will of God), these explanations descend lower and lower into the sphere of petty, often stupid, dialectics, and farther and farther does the hope recede of having the Godrevealed truths explained.

After this, in the 2d division, there are adduced the proofs of the fathers of the church that God is an incorporeal, immaterial essence, and the same argument is continued. What is quoted is not the false, but the queer, reasoning of the fathers of the church, which shows that the fathers of the church were far from that conception of God which is common with every believer at the present time. They take pains to prove, for example, that God is not Hmited by anything, or is not subject to suffering, or not subject to destruction. No matter how worthy the labours of these fathers have been in the time of struggle against the pagans, the statement that God is not subject to suffering has involuntarily the same effect upon us as would have the statement that God does not need any raiment or food, and proves that to a man who argues the indestructibility of God the conception of the Deity is not clear and not settled. It does not explain anything to us and only offends our feeling. But, apparently, the compiler needs it : precisely what offends our feeling is what he needs, namely, the abasement of the idea of God.

In the 3d division the compiler quotes, in the shape of a proof, that invective which the fathers of the church uttered in defence of their opinion :

"In connection with this it is important for us to notice that the ancient pastors, rebuking the errors of the anthropomorphists, called their opinion a senseless, most stupid heresy, and accounted the anthropomorphists, who held this opinion, as heretics."

And as the last argument of the church the following is adduced :

"For this reason we hear, among other things, in the * order of Orthodoxy,' which the Orthodox Church performs in the first week of the Great Lent, the following words : ' Anathema on those who say that God is not spirit, but flesh ! ' "

That ends all we know about the substance of God, namely, that he is a spirit. What is the deduction from all that ? That God is not an essence, but a spirit : all that results from the conception of God, and all believers cannot help thinking otherwise. This is partly confirmed by this article. But, in addition to that, we have the statement that this spirit is something special, separate, almost incomprehensible. In this verbal blending of the contradictions consists the subject matter of Art. 18. What the purpose is, appears clearly from the following 18 th article.

"18. The idea of the essential properties of God, — their number and division. — The essential properties in God (rot ovaiioSr] iStw/xara, proprietates essentiales), or, in one word (d^^tw/xara, Soy/xara, iTTLTrjSevfxaTa, attributa, perfsc- tiones), are such as belong to the divine essence alone and distinguish him from all other beings, and so they are properties which are equally applicable to all the persons of the Holy Trinity, who form one in their essence, for which reason they are also called general divine properties (tStw/mra Kotvd) in contradistinction to special or personal attributes (to. Trpoo-wTrtKa iSiMfxara, proprietates personales), which belong to each person of the Deity taken separately and thus distinguish them among themselves." (p. 102.)

It turns out that God, a simple spirit, has properties which distinguish him from all other beings. More than that : in addition to the general, divine attributes, there are others, which distinguish the same God in the three persons, though nothing has as yet been said about what the Trinity, and what a person is.

"It is impossible to define the number of essential or common properties of God. Though the church, in giving us a sound idea about God, mentions some of these ('God is a Spirit, eternal, all-good, omniscient, all-just, almighty, omnipresent, unchangeable, all-sufficing to himself, all-blessed'), it at the same time remarks that God's general properties are endless, for everything which is said in revelation about God, one in essence, in a certain sense forms the properties of the divine being. Consequently we, following the example of the church, shall limit ourselves to the analysis of some of them, the chief ones, such as more than any others characterize the essence of God and embrace or explain the other, less perceptible properties, and such as are more clearly mentioned in the divine revelation." (p. 102.)

The attributes of God are numberless, and so we are going to speak of some of them. But, if they are numberless, a few of them are an infinitely small part, and so it is unnecessary and impossible to speak of them. But not so judges the Theology. Not only of some, but of the chief ones among them ! How can there be a chief one in an endless number ? All are equally infinitely small.

"We shall speak of such as more than any other characterize the Deity."

Characterize how ? God has a character, that is, the distinction of one god from others. No, it is clear that we are talking about something else and^ not about God. But let us proceed.

"In order to have distinct ideas about the essential properties of God and to expound the teaching about them in a certain system, the theologians have since antiquity tried to divide them into classes, and of such divisions, especially in the mediaeval and modern period, many have been invented, and all of them, though not in the same degree, have their virtues and their defects. The main reason for the latter is quite comprehensible : the attributes of the divine being, like the essence itself, are entirely incomprehensible to us. Therefore, without making a vain attempt to find any one most perfect divi- sion of them, we shall select the one which to us appears most correct and most simple." (pp. 102 and 103.)

The properties of the essence of God, as well as the essence itself, are quite incoynprehensiUe to us. Well ? Let us not scoff and talk of the incomprehensible ! No. "We shall select a division which to us will appear most correct."

"God, according to his essence, is a spirit; but in every spirit we distinguish, in particular, in addition to the spiritual nature proper (the substance), two main forces or faculties : mind and will."

How can there be the division into mind and will in a simple spirit ? Where was that said ? There was a general statement about the spirit, but there was nothing said about its having mind and will. Mind and will are words with which we, men, and only a few of us, distinguish in ourselves two activities. But why has God that?

"In conformity with this, the essential properties of God may be divided into three classes : (1) into properties of the divine essence in general, that is, into such as belong equally to the spiritual nature (substance) of God and to its two forces, to mind and will, and distinguish God, as a spirit in general, from all other beings; (2) into properties of the divine mind, that is, such as belong only to the divine mind; and finally (3) into properties of the divine will, that is, such as belong only to the divine will."

Had I not better throw it all up ? For is that not the delirium of an insane man ? No, I said to myself that I would analyze strictly and thoroughly the whole exposition of the Theology.

Then follow 60 pages on the properties of God. Here are the contents of these 60 pages :

"19. The properties of the divine essence in general. God, as a spirit, is distinguished from all other beings in general, in that they are all limited in their existence and in their forces, consequently more or less imperfect, while he is an unlimited spirit, or limitless, hence all-perfect." (pp. 103 and 104.)

"God is distinguished from all other beings in general." This false conception of God as distinguished from all other beings is apparently needed because before and many times afterward and here it says that God is limitless, and therefore it is impossible to say that the limitless can be distinguished from anything.

"In particular, all other beings : (a) are limited in the beginning and during the continuation of their existence; all of them have received their existence through God and are in constant dependence on him, and partly on each other; God does not receive his existence from anybody, and in nothing is he dependent on anybody, — he is selfexisting and independent; (b) they are limited in the manner or form of their existence, for they are inevitably subject to the conditions of space and time, and so are subject to changes; God is above all conditions of space, — he is immeasurable and omnipresent, — and above all conditions of time, — he is eternal and unchangeable; (c) finally they are limited in their strength, both in quality and in quantity; but for God there are no limits even in this respect, — he is all-powerful and almighty. Thus the chief qualities which belong to God in his essence in general are : (1) unlimitedness or all-perfection, (2) self-existence, (3) independence, (4) immeasurableness and omnipresence, (5) eternity, (6) unchangeableness, and (7) almightiness."

Then, God is distinguished from other beings in particular :

"(1) By his unlimitedness or all-perfection." Why unlimitedness is equal to all-perfection remains unexplained, both here and elsewhere.

"(2) By his self-existence and (3) independence." What difference there is between self-existence and independence again remains unexplained. Self-existence is explained as follows :

"God is called self-existent because he does not owe his existence to any other being, but has his existence, and everythiug else which he has, from himself."

His independence is explained on p. 110 as follows :

"Under the name of independence in God we understand a quahty by force of which he is in his essence and forces and actions determined only by himself and not by anything external, and he is self-satisfied (avTdpKrjs, avev- Seijs), self-willed (avT€$ov(no<s), self -ruled {avroKpaTr}^), — this property of God results from the preceding. If God is a self-existent being and everything he has he has through himself, that means that he is not dependent on anybody, at least not in his existence and powers." (p. 110.)

Thus, in the first attribute of unlimitedness there is attached to it, for some reason, the idea of all-perfection (an unused and badly compounded word), which from its composition has an entirely different meaning from unlimitedness. But the words "self-existence "and "independence," which, according to the definition of the author himself, express the identical idea, are separated.

(4) Immeasurableness, which is only a synonym of unlimitedness, is suddenly combined into one with omnipresence, which has nothing in common with that idea. Then :

(5) Eternity and (6) unchangeableness are again separated, though they form one idea, for changeableness takes place only in time, and time is only the consequence of changeableness.

(7) Almightiness, which is defined by the concept of unlimited force, though neither before nor later will there be anything said about force. But that is far from being all. We must remember that after the disclosure of the essence of God in himself (Art. 17, p. 95), we have had disclosed to us the essential properties of God (Art. 18, p. 102). Of the essential properties of God there have now been disclosed to us the essential properties of God in general (Art. 19, p. 103). We still are to get the disclosure of the properties, at first, of God's mind (Art. 20, p. 122), and then of the properties of God's will (Art. 21, p. 129).

"God's mind may be viewed from two sides : from the theoretical and from the practical side, that is, in itself and in relation to God's actions. In the first case we get the idea of one property of this mind, of omniscience; in the latter, of another, of the highest all-wisdom."

God knows everything in himself. What else does he know if he has all-wisdom ? On p. 127 it says :

"All-wisdom consists in the completest knowledge of the best purposes and the best means, and at the same time in the fullest ability to apply the latter to the first."

The knowledge of the best purposes and means ! But how can an unlimited, all-satisfied being have any purposes ? And what concept of means can there be applied to an almighty being ? But that is not enough :

"Holy Scripture defines in detail the subjects of the divine knowledge. It bears testimony in general to the fact that God knows everything, and in particular, that he knows himself and everything outside of himself : everything possible and actual, everything past, present, and future." (p. 122.)

Then, in parts, with quotations from Holy Scripture, the author proves that God knows (a) everything, (b) himself, (c) everything possible, (d) everything existing, (e) the past, (/) the present, (g) the future. But God is outside of time, according to the Theology, above time, — so what past and future is there for him ? And God is outside of space, — he is an unlimited, limitless, omniscient being, — how can there be anything "outside of "him ? "Outside of "means beyond the limits, beyond the borders of something limited. I am not exaggerating, am not on purpose expressing myself in a strange manner, on the contrary, I am using every efi'ort to soften the wildness of the expressions. Kead pp. 123-125 ! What am I saying ! Open those two volumes anywhere, and read them ! It is all the time the same, and the farther you proceed, the more liberated from all laws of the connection of thoughts and words !

"21. The will of God may be viewed from two sides : in itself and in relation to creatures. In the first case it presents itself to us (a) in the highest degree free according to its essence, and (h) all-holy in its free activity. In the latter it appears, first of all, (a) all-good, — since goodness is the first and chief cause of all divine acts in relation to all creatures, rational and irrational; then, (p) in particular, in relation to rational creatures only, true and correct, for it is revealed to them in the form of a moral law for their wills, and in the form of promises or moral incitements toward the performance of this law; finally (c) all-just, in so far as it watches the moral actions of these creatures and repays them according to their deserts. Thus the chief properties of the will of God, or, more correctly, the chief divine properties according to his will, are (1) highest freedom, (2) completest hohness, (3) infinite goodness, (4) completest truth and correctness, and (5) infinite justice." (pp. 129 and 130.)

So it turns out that the limitless, unlimited God is free, and this is proved by texts. And, as always, the texts show that those who wrote and spoke those words did not understand God and only approached a comprehension of him and spoke of a strong, pagan god, but not of the God we believe in.

"I have made the earth, the man and the beast that are upon the ground, by my great power and by my out-stretched arm, and have given it unto whom it seemed meet unto me (Jer. xxvii. 5). I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion (Eom ix. 15; cf. Exod. xxxii. 19). And he doeth according to his will in the army of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth : and none can stay his hand, or say unto him, What doest thou ? (Dan. iv. 35; cf. Job xxiii. 13). The Most High ruleth in the kingdom of men, and giveth it to whomsoever he will (Dan. iv. 17, 25, 32). The king's heart is in the hand of the Lord, as the rivers of water : he turneth it whithersoever he will (Prov. xxi. 1). Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing ? and one of them shall not fall on the ground without your Father; but the very hairs of your head are all numbered (Matt. x. 29, 30). (c) In the redemption of man : Having predestinated us unto the adoption of children by Jesus Christ to himself, according to the good pleasure of his will (Ephes. i. 5). Having made known unto us the mystery of his will, according to his good pleasure which he hath purposed in himself (Ephes. i. 9). And Christ the Saviour gave himself for our sins, that he might deHver us from this present evil world, according to the will of God and our Father : to whom be glory for ever and ever (Gal. i. 4, 5). {d) For our regeneration and purification "(all this is an account of the manifestations of God's freedom) : "Of his own will begat he us with the word of truth, that we should be a kind of firstfruits of his creatures (James i. 18). But the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man to profit withal; for to one is given by the Spirit the word of wisdom; to another, the word of knowledge by the same Spirit.... But all these worketh that one and the self-same Spirit, dividing to every man severally as he will (1 Cor. xii. 7, 8, 11).

"The holy fathers and teachers of the church, who in their writings mentioned the divine freedom in general, frequently expressed their ideas with peculiar clearness, in three cases, (a) when they armed themselves against the ancient philosophers, who affirmed that the universe was eternal and had sprung from God not by his will, but of necessity, as the shadow from the body, or the glow from the light, (b) when they refuted the errors of the pagans and certain heretics, who asserted that everything in the universe and God himself were subject to fate, and (c) when, wishing to define wherein the image of God consisted in us, they assumed it to be in man's free will. In all these cases they pointed out that God was not subject to any necessity and quite freely determined himself toward actions; that he had created in the beginning everything which he had wished and as he had wished, and continued to do everything in the world only by his will, and that he, in general, in his essence, was self-willed.

'< Indeed, if God is a most perfect spirit, and an independent and almighty spirit, our reason, too, must be conscious of the fact that God is free in the highest degree according to his essence; freedom is a most essential property of a conscious spirit, and he who is all-powerful and holds everything in his power, himself not dependent on anything, cannot be subject to necessity or compulsion.

"(2) Completest holiness. Calling God holy (ayio?, sanctus), we profess that he is completely pure from all sin, that he cannot even sin, and in all his acts is entirely true to the moral law, and so he hates the evil and loves only the good in all his creatures." (pp. 130-132.)

The holiness consists in God's not sinning, and in his hating evil. And again a confirmation of this scoffing from Holy Scripture.

"(3) Infinite goodness. Goodness in God is a property by which he is always ready to confer, and actually does confer, as many benefits as each of the creatures is able to receive by its nature and condition."

And here is how this goodness is confirmed :

"Goodness is the chief cause of creation and providence; God has existed and continued in bhss since eternity, without having any need of any one; but only of his infinite goodness he wanted to make other beings the copartners of his bliss, and so he gave them existence, adorned them with various perfections, and did not stop lavishing upon them all benefits which are necessary for existence and bliss." (p. 138.)

From eternity, that is, an endless number of years, God lived in bhss by himself and with all his all-wisdom had not thought before of creating the world. Thus goodness, which is to be taken in the sense that the idea of evil cannot be connected with the idea of God, is mutilated in this conception and debased to the lowest, blasphemous representation.

"(4) Completest truth and verity. We profess God as being true and veracious (aX-qOivo^, ivKTro^, verax, fidelis), because whatever he reveals to creatures he reveals correctly and exactly, and in particular, no matter what promises or threats he utters, he always carries out what he says."

True to whom ? The idea of threat and punishment, the idea of evil, connected with God ! And then texts which confirm the statement that God cannot lie !

"(5) Infinite justice. Under the name of justice, or truth (SiKaLoa-vvrj, justicia), we here understand the property in God by which he metes out the due to all moral creatures, namely, he rewards the good and punishes the bad." (p. 140.)

The all-good God metes out etei-nal punishment to people for a sin committed in the temporal life. And that is confirmed by texts :

"And the unrighteous will hear the heavy doom of the unbiased judge : Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels (Matt. xxv.

41). Besides, holy Scripture (b) bears testimony to the fact that the curse of the Lord is in the house of the wicked (Prov. iii. 33; cf. Prov. xv. 25), and he shall bring upon them their own iniquity, and shall cut them off in their own wickedness (Psalm xciv. 23); (c) calls God a consuming fire : For our God is a consuming fire (Heb. xii. 29; Deut. iv. 24), and (d) in human fashion ascribes to him anger and vengeance : For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who hold the truth in unrighteousness (Rom. i. 18; cf. Exod. xxxii. 10, Num. xi. 10, Psalms ii. 5 and Ixxxviii. 5-7, 16, Ezek. vii. 14). Vengeance is mine; I wiU repay, saith the Lord (Rom. xii. 19; Heb. x. 30; Deut. xxxii. 35). Lord God of vengeance, God hath not shewn himself (Psalm xciv. !)•" (P-142.)

This apparent contradiction did not arrest the author, just as he had not been arrested by the contradictions in each division of the properties of God, but here he stopped, apparently because the contradiction had been observed long ago and there had been objections raised, and the holy fathers, on the basis of whom the whole book is written, had expressed themselves in regard to it. Here is what the holy fathers had said about it :

"The true God must of necessity be both good and just; his goodness is a just goodness, and his truth a just truth; he remains just even when he forgives us our sins and pardons us; he remains good when he punishes us for our sins, for he punishes us as a father, not in anger or revenge, but in order to mend us, for our own moral advantage, and so his very punishments are a greater proof of his paternal goodness toward us and his love than of his truth."

The question is how to solve the contradiction between goodness and justice. How can a good God punish with eternal fire for sins ? Either he is not just, or not good.

The question seems to be both simple and legitimate. The author makes it appear that he is answering the question when he quotes the authorities of Irenseus, TertuUian, Clement of Alexandria, Chrysostom, Hilary, Augustine. There are plenty of authorities, but what have they said ? They have said: ''You ask whether God can be just if there is eternal torment for a temporal sin ? And we answer that God must be both just and good. His goodness is just goodness, and his justice is good justice." But that is precisely what I am asking : How is this ? How can a good and just God punish with eternal torment for a temporal sin ? And you say that he punishes Kke a father for our moral good, and that his punishments are a proof of his goodness and love. What kind of correction and love is tliis, to burn for ever in fire for a temporal sin ? But the author thinks he has explained everything, and he calmly finishes the chapter :

"Every sound mind must acknowledge the completest justice in God. Every injustice toward others can arise in us only from two causes, — from ignorance or from the error of our mind and from perversity of will. But in God these causes cannot take place : God is an omniscient and most holy being; he knows all the most hidden deeds of moral beings and is able worthily to appreciate them; he loves every good by his own nature, and hates every evil also by his nature. Let us add that God is at the same time an almighty being who, therefore, has all the means at hand in order to recompense others according to their deserts." (pp. 143 and 144.)

I have quoted this merely to show that I do not leave out a thing. That is all which is used to solve the contradiction. The disclosure of the essence of God in himself and in his essential properties is finished. What was there in it ? It began by saying that God was incomprehensible, but the statement was added that at the same time he was comprehensible in part. This knowledge in part is disclosed to us in such a way that God is one, and not two or three, that is, to the idea of God there is added an improper concept of number which, by the first definition, is not applicable to him.

Then it is disclosed to us that in the partly comprehensible God we none the less know the distinction between his essence and his properties. The definition of the essence of God consisted in saying that he was a spirit, that is, an immaterial, simple, uncomplicated being, which, therefore, excludes all subdivision. But immediately after that it is disclosed that we know the properties of this simple essence and are able to subdivide it. About the number of these properties it says that it is infinite, but from this infinite number of properties of the simple essence, the spirit, fourteen properties are disclosed to us. After that we are suddenly told that this simple essence, the spirit, differs from all other beings and, besides, has mind and will (nothing is said about what is to be understood by the words "mind "and "will "of a simple essence, the spirit), and on the basis of the fact that the simple essence is composed of mind and will, fourteen properties are divided into three classes : (a) essential properties in general. The essential properties of the divine essence in general (I change nothing and add nothing) are agait subdivided (aa) into essential properties of the divine essence in general which distinguish it in general (sic !) from other beings, and (bh) into essential properties of the divine essence in general which distinguish it in particular from other beings, and thus we receive (aaa) unlimitedness, to which for some reason allperfection is unexpectedly attached by a sign of equality, (bbb) self-existence, (ccc) independence, (ddd) immeasurableness and omnipresence (again unexpectedly patched on to it), (eee) eternity, (fff) unchangeableness, (ggg) almightiness. The properties of the divine mind are (a) omniscience, (b) the highest wisdom; and the properties of the divine will are (a) freedom, (b) holiness, (c) goodness, {d) truth, (e) justice. The method of the exposition is the same as in the previous parts : obscurity of expressions, contradictions, clothed in words which elucidate nothing, an abasement of the subject, its reduction to the lowest sphere, a neglect of the demands of reason, and the eternally repeated tendency to connect in an external, verbal way the most diversified judgments about God, beginniug with Abraham and going on to the fathers of the church, and on that tradition alone to base all the arguments. But in this part, which has so clearly deviated from the path of common sense (from the very first statements about God, where the determination of the divine properties begin), there is a new feature : there is a composition of words which apparently have absolutely no meaning for the author. Obviously the words have been detached entirely from the thought with which they were connected, and no longer evoke any ideas. For a long time I made terrible efforts to understand what is understood, for example, by the various spiritual essences, by the distinctions of the properties and by independence, by the divine mind and will, and could not understand it, and convinced myself that all the author wanted was in an external way to connect all the texts, but that even for the author there did not exist a rational connection in his own words.

22. Tliis article speaks of the same thing that involuntarily presents itself to one when the properties of the incomprehensible God are counted out to him. Every person who believes in God cannot help feeling the blasphemy of these subdivisions. And here the words of the fathers of the church express precisely what each believer feels, namely, that God is incomprehensible to reason, and that all those words and epithets which we have applied to God have no clear meaning and blend into one, and that the conception of God as a beginning of everything and incomprehensible to reason, is simply indivisible, and that to divide God according to his essence and properties is the same as destroying the idea of God.

The essence and the essential properties of God are not distinguished or divided among themselves in reality : on the contrary, they are one in God. This idea necessarily results from those passages of Holy Scripture where God is represented as the purest spirit and from him are removed all materiality, corporeality, and complexity. If the essential properties in God were indeed separate and distinct from his essence and from one another, he would not be simple, but complex, that is, he would be composed of his essence and of his properties which are distinct among themselves. Thus reasoned the fathers of the church : "The Deity is simple and uncompounded," says St. John Damascene, "for what is composed of many and various things is composite. If we shall thus take uncreatedness, uncommeucedness, incorporeahty, immortahty, eternity, goodness, creative power, and similar properties as essential distinctions in God (ovaL(oSeLocf)6paq iirl Oeov), the Deity, being composed of so many properties, will not be simple, but composite; but it would be extreme infidelity to affirm that." (p. 145.)

Other extracts are quoted from the holy fathers in confirmation of this idea, so that one only wonders what all those former subdivisions and definitions were for. But these clear, incontestable arguments, which reecho in the heart of each behever in God as full of truth, are preceded by just such an unexpected discussion as was given in the case of the comprehensibility and incomprehensibility of God, and such as those which precede the disclosure of each dogma. In the dogma about God the statement is made and proved that God is incomprehensible, and then there is a pretence at a proof that he is comprehensible. For the solution of this contradiction there is invented the doctrine about comprehensibility in part. Here it says that the essence and the essential properties of God are not distinguished or divided, and immediately on p. 147 it says :

"The essence and the essential properties of God, without being distinguished or divided between themselves in fact, are, none the less, distinguished in our ratiocination, and not without foundation in God himself, so that the concept of any one property of his is not at the same time a concept of his essence, or a concept of any other property." (p. 147.)

This proposition, in the author's opinion, necessarily results from Holy Scripture, and there are quoted the words of Basil the Great that "our distinctions of the divine properties are not merely purely subjective, no, their foundation is in God himself, in his various manifestations, actions, relations to himself, such as the creation and providence, though in himself God is one, simple, uncompounded." (p. 149.)

Do you imagine that this palpable contradiction of the holy fathers is accidentally collated ? Do you think that it is solved in any way ? Not in the least. That is precisely what the author needs, and in that lies the meaning of this 2 2d article. It begins like this :

"This question has been raised in the church since antiquity, but especially during the Middle Ages, both in the West and the East, and in solving it men have frequently fallen into extremes. The first extreme assumes that between the essence and the essential properties of God, as well as between the properties themselves, there is a real difference (rw Trpay/xart, realis), so that the properties form in God something distinct from the essence and from each other; the other extreme, on the contrary, affirms that the essence and all the essential properties of God are absolutely identical among themselves, and that they are not separated, either in fact, or even in our ratiocination (cTTivota voijcret, cogitatione)." (p. 144.)

The Orthodox Church teaches that both propositions are equally remote from truth. Which, then, is nearer to the truth ? Nothing is said about that. Two opposite opinions are put forth, and nothing is said for their solution. I carefully searched in all five pages, and there is not a word in them about how it is to be understood. Not a word. The conclusion of the article is as follows :

"Eemarkable are also the words of St. Augustine that refer to the present case : ' It is one thing to be God, another to be Father. Though paternity and essence (in God) are one, it is impossible to say that the Father by his paternity is God, by his paternity all- wise.. Such has always been the firm conviction of our fathers, and they rejected the Anomoeans as having erred far beyond the limits of the faith, because these heretics destroyed all distinction between the essence and the divine properties.' "(p. 150.)

The end of the chapter. But are the Anomoeans right, or why are the words of the blessed St. Augustine remarkable ? that makes no difference. But how are we to understand it all ? The words of St. John Damascene are true, as the author himself says. How are they to be made to agree with the contradictory words of St. Augustine ? And are they true or not ? The author does not even regard it as necessary to answer this, and concludes the chapter.

In the preceding article about the essence and the fourteen divine properties I was struck by the trait of the complete disassociation of ideas and the manifest play with mere contradictory or synonymous words in complete darkness; but here is another feature of an extraordinary neglect, offensive not only to my reason, but also to my feelings, which is shown to me and to the whole congregation which is listening to the teacliings of the church.

In this article is directly expressed a contradiction, and it says : "This is white, and this black," and you can- not say that this is white, nor that this is black, for the church teaches you to recognize both, that is, that the black is white, and the white black, so that here is expressed not only a demand that you should believe what the church says, but that you should repeat with your tongue what it says.

After that comes Article 23 : The moral application of the dogma. The moral application of the first dogma, of the dogma of the divine unity, had struck me only by its inconsistency. The moral rules which were taught on the basis of the unity of God were apparently not deduced from it, but were simply patched on the words, "God is one, we must live in oneness," and so forth. But when I met with the second apphcation and, in looking through the whole work for all the moral rules which were inevitably applied to each dogma, recalled what had been said in the Introduction, that the dogmas of faith and the laws of morality (p. 36) had inseparably been revealed by God to men and w^ere inseparably connected, I understood ^hat these applications were not accidental, but very important, as showing <"he meaning of the dogmas for the saving life, and so I turned my closie attention to them. Here is the application of the dogma about the essence and the properties of God :

"(1) God by his essence is a spirit, and, by the chief property of the essence which embraces all the others, he is an unlimited spirit, that is, most perfect, highest, allglorious. From this (a) we learn, first of all, to honour and love God, for whom shall we honour and whom love, if not the most perfect, when every perfection naturally evokes these feehngs in us ? The love of God, united with respect, forms the foundation of all our obligations toward him (Matt. xxii. 37); (h) we learn at the same time that our love of God and our honouring of God must be (aa) sincerest, spiritual : God is a Spirit : and they that worship him must worship him in spirit and in truth, says the

Saviour (John iv. 24); every external worship can have a value only when it is an expression of something inward, otherwise it displeases God (Is. i. 11-15), and the sacrifices of God are a broken spirit, according to the words of the Prophet (Psalm li. 17); Q)b) highest and fullest, because in his perfections God infinitely surpasses all other beings to whom we are able to feel respect and love; consequently, him above all else must we love with all our heart, and with all our soul, and with all our mind, and with all our strength (Mark xii. 30); (cc) most profoundly reverential : if even the seraphim, who in heaven surround the throne of God the All-holder, unable to endure the grandeur of his glory, cover their faces when they cry unto one another, Holy, holy, holy, is the Lord of hosts (Is. vi. 3), then with what trepidation of awe ought we, the lowest and weakest of his spiritual creatures, to serve him (Psalm ii. 11) ?

"(c) Let us learn to glorify God with our heart and our mouth, with our mind and all our Life, remembering the words of the Psalmist : Give unto the Lord the glory due unto his name : bring an offering, and come into his courts (Psalm xcv. 8; cxliv. 3), and the words of the Saviour : Let your light so shine before men, that they may see your good works, and glorify your Father which is in heaven (Matt. v. 16).

"(d) Let us learn, at last, to turn to God as our highest good, and in him alone look for our fullest consolation, repeating with David : Whom have I in heaven but thee ? and there is none upon earth that I desire beside thee. My flesh and my heart faileth : but God is the strength of my heart, and my portion for ever (Psalm Ixxiii. 25, 26). However profound the thirst of our mind may be in its search after truth, God is the highest truth; however fiery the striving of our will may be toward the good, God is the most perfect good; however insatiable the love of our heart may be for happiness and bliss, God is the highest and interminable bliss. Where, then, if not in him, shall we be able to find a full gratification for all the high needs of our spirit ?

"(2) Reflecting, in particular, on the separate properties of the divine essence, which distinguish God from his creatures, we can draw from them new lessons for ourselves. And {a) if God alone is self -existent, that is, is in no way under any obligations to any one, while all the other beings, consequently we, too, are under obligations to him, we must {aa) constantly humble ourselves before him, according to the words of Scripture, What hast thou that thou didst not receive ? now if thou didst receive it, why dost thou glory, as if thou hadst not received it ? (1 Cor. iv. 7); and (bh) constantly thank him : for in him we live and move and have our being (Acts xvii. 28). (b) If he alone is independent and all-satisfied, and so does not demand our goodness (Psalm xvi. 2), but, on the contrary, gives to all life and breath, and all things (Acts xvii. 25), we must {aa) experience within us a feeling of the fullest dependence on him and of the most complete submission to him, and (W) in bringing him gifts or sacrifices not imagine that we are obliging the allsatisfied God in this manner, since all which we have is his property, (c) The confidence that we are always before the face of the omnipresent God, no matter where we may be, (aa) naturally inclines us to act before him with the greatest circumspection and reverence; (hh) can keep us from sins, as it once kept Joseph from sinning (Gen. xxxix. 9); (cc) can encourage and console us in all perils, as it consoled David, who said about himself : I have set the Lord always before me;^ because he is at my right hand, I shall not be moved (Psalm xvi. 8); {dd) can incite us to invoke, glorify, and thank the Lord in every place (John iv. 21-24).

** {d) Keeping in mind that God alone is eternal, while everything else which surrounds us on earth is temporal and vanishing, we learn (aa) not to cleave with the soul to perishable possessions, but to seek the one, imperishable possession in God (Matt. vi. 19, 20); (bh) not to put our trust in princes, nor in the sons of man, who may die any moment and leave us without a support (Psalm cxlvi. 3-5), but to put our trust in him who alone has immortality (1 Tim. vi. 16) and will never abandon us.

"(e) The thought of God's complete unchangeabihty (aa) can still more incite us to put this exclusive trust in God, for men in general are fickle, the favour of the great and mighty of the earth is easily shaken and passes, the very love of our relatives and friends frequently betrays us, whereas God alone is always the same and unchangeable; (hh) can at the same time incite us to imitate the unchangeableness of God in a moral sense, that is, to be as firm and constant as possible in all the honourable pursuits of our spirit, and in our unwavering march along the path of virtue and salvation.

"(/ ) The live faith in almighty God teaches us (aa) to implore his aid and blessing in all our undertakings : except the Lord keep the city, the watchman waketh but in vain (Psalm cxxvii. 1); (bb) not to be afraid of anything and not to lose courage amidst the greatest dangers, so long as we are doing what pleases him and thus attract his good-will : if God be for us, who can be against us ? (Eom. viii. 31); but {cc) to fear him and tremble before him, if w^e do what displeases him : he is able to destroy not only our body, but also our soul in hell (Matt. x. 28).

"(3) If we turn our attention to the properties of the divine mind, we shall find even here many edifying things for ourselves, (a) God is omniscient : what consolation and encouragement for the righteous man ! Let people who do not know his intentions and are not able to appreciate his actions, insult, and even persecute him, he is rewarded by the knowledge that God himself clearly sees his soul with all its thoughts and wishes, knows all his deeds in the bloody battle with the enemies of salvation, knows his intentional privations and innocent suffering, knows every sigh and every tear of his amidst heavy temptation ! No matter how hypocritical he may be before men, how much he may try to conceal his criminal intentions, in what darkness he may be committing his lawlessness, he cannot help confessing that there is a being from whom it is impossible to conceal himself, before whom everything is naked and open (Heb. iv. 13), and that it is possible to deceive men, but never God. (b) God is infinitely wise; and thus (aa) let not our mind and soul be dejected if in social life or in Nature we shall see any phenomena which seem to threaten a universal ruin and destruction, for all that is done or omitted by the unsearchable fate of the highest wisdom; (bb) let us not be faint of heart or murmur against God if we ourselves have occasion to be in straitened circumstances, but let us rather give ourselves altogether to his holy will, believing that he knows better than we what is useful and what harmful to us; (cc) let us learn according to our strength to imitate his highest wisdom, tending all the time toward that supreme aim, which he has set for us, and selecting for ourselves those most reliable means, which he himself has outlined for us in his revelation.

"(4) Finally, each of the properties of the divine will either only offers us a model for imitation, or at the same time also imparts certain other moral lessons, (a) God is called supremely free, because he always selects only what is good, and this he does without any external pressure or incitement; it is in this, then, that our true freedom ought to consist! In the possibility and freely acquired habit of doing only what is good, only because it is good, and not in the arbitrary will of doing good and evil, as people generally think, and still less in the arbitrary will of doing only what is bad : for whosoever committeth sin is the servant of sin, says our Saviour (John viii. 34), and, committing evil, we every time lose part of our freedom, more and more submitting to our passions and impure strivings, over which we ought to rule, (h) God is supremely holy and has commanded to us: ye shall sanctify yourselves, and ye shall be holy; for I am holy, the Lord your God (Lev. xL 44). Without this condition we can never become worthy of the most bhssful union with the Lord : for what communion hath light with darkness ? (2 Cor. vi. 14); nor shall we ever be worthy of seeing God : for only the pure in heart shall see God (Matt. v. 8). (c) God is infinitely good to all his creatures and to us in particular; this (aa) teaches us to thank him for all his benefits, and for his paternal love to repay him with filial love : we love him, because he first loved us (1 John iv, 19)."

Not only is there no sense in all that, but there is not even any connection except what the French call ^ propos. Indeed, what moral apphcation can there be from the fact that God is one and immeasurable, and a spirit, and trine ? What is remarkable is not that the exposition of this moral application of the dogma is written disconnectedly and badly, but that an application has been invented for a dogma that can have no applications at all. Involuntarily it occurs to me : why should I know these incomprehensible, most contradictory dogmas, since from their knowledge absolutely nothing can result ?